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Abstract
Although firms are dispersed across space and may face radically different production con-
ditions, this dimension of firm heterogeneity is often overlooked. Differences between factor
markets, especially for labor, are stark. To pursue this line of inquiry, we model firm hiring
across local labor markets. We then use the model to estimate and quantify the role of dis-
tinct regional labor markets in firm input use, productivity and location by combining firm
and population census data. Considering modern China as a country with substantial regional
variation, we find labor costs vary by 30-80%, leading to 3-17% differences in TFP once non-
labor inputs are considered. Favorably endowed regions attract more value added per capita,
providing new insights into within-country comparative advantage and specialization.
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1 Introduction
A number of studies document large and persistent differences in productivity across both countries
and firms.1 However, these differences remain largely ‘some sort of measure of our ignorance’
(Abramovitz, 1956). This paper inquires to what extent the supply characteristics of regional
input markets might help explain such systematic productivity dispersion across firms. It would be
surprising if disparate factor markets result in similar outcomes, when clearly the prices and quality
of inputs available vary considerably. Modeling firm adaptation to different factor markets provides
insights and testable predictions about how firms produce and where they choose to locate.
Differences between factor markets, especially for labor, are likely to be especially stark in de-
veloping economies undergoing urbanization (Lewis, 1954), or when government policies increase
relocation costs beyond those normally present.2 Even the US labor market, which is considered
relatively fluid, exhibits high migration costs as measured by the wage differential required to
drive relocation (Kennan and Walker, 2011). Thus, free movement of factors does not mean fric-
tionless movement, and recent work has indicated imperfect factor mobility has sizable economic
effects (Topalova, 2010). Rather than considering the forces which cause workers to locate across
space, this paper instead takes a different turn to inquire what existing differences in regional input
markets imply for firm input use, productivity and location.
Although there might be many complementary ways to address our question, we take an ap-
proach rooted in the general equilibrium trade literature to understand how local endowments im-
pact firms which enter endogenously, as typified by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007). We
extend their model to incorporate entry across regional markets and richer employment structures.
Each region is endowed with a different distribution of skill types and wages across workers. In-
dustries vary in team technology, which is their ability to substitute between different types of labor
(e.g. Bowles, 1970). Firms hire teams of workers by choosing the optimal combination of workers
given local conditions. Since each firm’s optimal labor force varies by industry technology and
region, the comparative suitability of regions varies by industry. Firms thus locate in proportion to
the cost advantages available.
In the model, finding new employees entails fixed costs and the ease of finding any type of
worker increases with their regional supply. Therefore firm hiring depends on the joint distribution
of worker types and wages. Since labor demand depends on technology and regional labor mar-
kets, this implies effective labor costs vary by region and industry. These labor costs help explain
differences in productivity.3 But are these differences economically important? To quantify real
1See Syverson (2011) for a review.
2Institutional mobility constraints, such as the hukou system in China, likely further exacerbate differences.
3Effective labor costs are driven by the complementarity of regional endowments with industry technology, and
the paper refers to these additional real production possibilities as ‘productivity’.
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world supply conditions, we use the model to derive estimating equations which fix: 1) hiring by
wage and worker type distributions, 2) substitution into non-labor inputs, and 3) firm location in
response to local factor markets.
The estimation strategy combines manufacturing and population census data for China in the
mid-2000s, a setting which exhibits substantial variation in labor market conditions. By revealing
how firm demand for skills varies with local conditions, the model allows recovery of the unit
costs for labor across China. Our estimates imply an interquartile difference in effective labor
costs of 30 to 80 percent. A second stage estimates production functions, explicitly accounting for
regional cost differences. Since firms are capable of substituting into non-labor inputs, productivity
differences are smaller than labor cost differences. Once substitution is accounted for, labor costs
result in firm productivity differences of 3 to 17 percent, and explain 4 to 43 percent of the variance
of productivity.4 Furthermore, we show that economic activity locates where regional costs are
lowest, as implied by the model.
We conclude this section by relating the paper to existing work. The paper then continues by
laying out a model that incorporates a rich view of the labor hiring process. The model explains
how firms internalize local labor market conditions to maximize profits, resulting in an industry
specific unit cost of labor by region. Section 3 places these firms in a general equilibrium, monop-
olistic competition framework, in particular addressing the determination of factor prices and firm
location. Section 4 explains how the model can be estimated with a simple nested OLS approach.
Section 5 discusses details of the data, while Section 6 presents our model estimates and uses them
to explain the effect of different regional input markets on firm behavior. Section 7 concludes.
Related work. Our consideration of firms as dependent on local factor markets is based on
models typified by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory of international trade (e.g. Vanek, 1968).
The departures from H-O-V in our model relax assumptions about perfect labor substitutability and
homogeneous factor markets, which quantifies the role of local labor markets. On the product mar-
ket side, we consider many goods as indicated by Bernstein and Weinstein (2002) as appropriate
when considering the locational role of factor endowments. We follow a multisector approach sim-
ilar to Melitz (2003), but add free entry by firms across regions. A firm’s optimal location depends
on local costs which arise from the regional distribution of worker types and wages, but competi-
tion from firms which enter the same region prevent complete specialization. The model quantifies
the intensity of firm entry and shows that within country, advantageous local factor markets are
important for understanding specialization patterns.5
Recently, both Borjas (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2010) have emphasized the importance
4These substantial differences underscore Kugler and Verhoogen (2011): since TFP is often the ‘primary measure
of [...] performance’, accounting for local factor markets might substantially alter estimates of policy effects.
5In spirit, this result is akin to Fitzgerald and Hallak (2004) who study the role of cross country productivity
differences in specialization. In our case, differences in unit labor costs predict specialization across regions.
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of more complete model frameworks to estimate substitution between worker types. In distinction
to the labor literature, our interest is firm substitution across factor markets. Dovetailing with this
are theories proposing that different industries perform optimally under different degrees of skill
diversity. Grossman and Maggi (2000) build a theoretical model explaining how differences in
skill dispersion across countries could determine comparative advantage and global trade patterns.
Building on this work, Morrow (2010) models multiple industries and general skill distributions,
and finds that skill diversity is explains productivity and export differences in developing countries.
The importance of local market characteristics, especially in developing countries, has recently
been emphasized by Karadi and Koren (2012). These authors calibrate a spatial firm model to
sector level data in developing countries to better account for the role of firm location in measured
productivity. Moretti (2011) reviews work on local labor markets and agglomeration economies,
explicitly modeling spatial equilibrium across labor markets. Distinct from this literature, we
take the outcome of spatial labor markets as given and focus on the trade offs firms face and the
consequences of regional markets on effective labor costs and firm location.6,7
Although we are unaware of other studies estimating model primitives as a function of local
market characteristics, reduced form empirical work is consonant with the theoretical implications.
Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti (2008) find that higher skill dispersion is associated with higher
TFP in Italy. Similarly, Parrotta, Pozzoli, and Pytlikova (2011) find that diversity in education
leads to higher productivity in Denmark. Martins (2008) finds that firm wage dispersion affects
firm performance in Portugal. Bombardini, Gallipoli, and Pupato (2011) use literacy scores to
show that countries with more dispersed skills specialize in industries characterized by lower skill
complementarity. In contrast, this paper combines firm and population census data to explicitly
model regional differences, leading to micro founded identification and estimates. The method
used is novel, and results of this paper highlight the degree to which firm behavior are influenced
through the availability of inputs at the micro level.8
Clearly this study also contributes to the empirical literature on Chinese productivity. Ma, Tang,
and Zhang (2011) show that exporting is positively correlated with TFP and that firms self select
into exporting which, ex post, further increases TFP. Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012)
estimate Chinese firm TFP, showing that new entry accounts for two thirds of TFP growth and that
6Several papers have explored how different aspects of labor affect firm-level productivity. There is substantial
work on the effect of worker skills on productivity (Abowd Kramarz and Margolis (1999, 2005), Fox and Smeets
(2011)). Other labor characteristics that drive productivity include managerial talent and practices (Bloom and Reenen,
2007), social connections among workers (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2009), organizational form (Garicano and
Heaton, 2010) and incentive pay (Lazear, 2000).
7Determinants of productivity include market structure (Syverson (2004)), product market rivalry and technology
spillovers (Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2007)) and vertical integration (Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007),
Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012)).
8The importance of backward linkages for firm behavior are a recurring theme in both the development and eco-
nomic geography literature, see Hirschman (1958) and recently Overman and Puga (2010).
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TFP growth dominates input accumulation as a source of output growth. Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
posit that India and China have lower productivity relative to the US due to resource misallocation
and compute how manufacturing TFP in India and China would increase if resource allocation was
similar to that of the US. This paper uncovers local factors that determine productivity. How this
interacts with the above mechanisms is a potential area for further work.9
2 The Role of Skill Mix in Production
This section develops a model of hiring in which firms respond to both the wages and quantities of
locally available worker types. Firms combine homogeneous inputs (materials, capital) and differ-
entiated inputs (types of labor). While homogeneous inputs are perfectly mobile within industries,
we take the distribution of labor endowments as given. Special cases of our model would include
perfect factor mobility (equal endowments in all regions) or high migration costs (equalization up
to mobility costs). Industries have different technologies available for combining types of labor
into teams. We proceed with a detailed specification of the labor hiring process, solving for firms’
optimal responses to local labor market supply conditions. This quantifies the unit cost for labor
by region in terms of observable local conditions and model parameters.
2.1 Firm Production
Firms within an industry T face a neoclassical production technology FT (M,K,L)which combines
materials M, capital K and labor L to produce output. An industry specific capital stock KT is
mobile within each industry, and in equilibrium is available at rental rate rTK . Similarly, an industry
specific stock of materials MT is mobile and available at price rTM. While M and K are composed
of homogeneous units, effective labor L is produced by combining heterogeneous worker types.
There are S skill types of workers which are distributed unequally across regions R. The dis-
tribution of worker types in region R is denoted aR =
(
aR,1, . . . ,aR,S
)
. The regional wages for
each type are take as exogenous by workers and firms, and in equilibrium are denoted wR =(
wR,1, . . . ,wR,S
)
. Workers do not contribute equally to output. This occurs for two reasons. First,
each type provides an industry specific level of human capital mTi . Second, when a worker meets a
firm, this match has a random quality h≥ 1 which follows a Pareto distribution, Ψ(h)≡ 1−h−k.
In order to hire workers, a firm must pay a fixed search cost of f effective labor units, at which
point they may hire from a distribution of worker types aR. The firm hires on the basis of match
quality, and consequently chooses a minimum threshold of match quality for each type they will
9Such regional differences might help explain the Chinese export facts of Manova and Zhang (2012) and the
different impact of liberalization across trade regimes found by Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2012).
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retain, h = (h1, . . . ,hS).
10 Upon keeping a preferred set of workers, the firm may this process N
times until achieving their desired workforce. At the end of hiring, the amount of human capital
produced by each type i is given by
Hi ≡ N ·aR,im
T
i
∫ ∞
hi
hdΨ. (2.1)
From a firm’s perspective, the threshold of worker match quality h is a means to choose an optimal
level of H. However, as a firm lowers its quality threshold, it faces an increasing average cost of
each type of human capital Hi . These increasing average costs induce the firm to maintain hi ≥ 1
and to increase N to search harder for suitable workers.
The amount of L produced by the firm depends on the composition of a team through a tech-
nological parameter θT in the following way:
L≡
(
Hθ
T
1 +H
θT
2 + . . .+H
θT
S
)1/θT
. (2.2)
Notice that in the case of θT = 1, this specification collapses to a model where L is the total level
of human capital ∑Hi. More generally, the Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution of type i for
type i′ is (Hi/Hi′)
θT−1. θT < 1 implies worker types are complementary, so that the firm’s ideal
workforce tends to represent a mix of all types (Figure 2.1a). In contrast, for θT > 1, firms are more
dependent on singular sources of human capital as L becomes convex in the input of each single
type (Figure 2.1b).11 Below, we show that despite the convexity inherent in Figure 2.1b, once
firms choose the quality of their workers through hiring standards h, the labor isoquants resume
their typical shapes as in Figure 2.1c. This avoids the possibility that some worker types are never
hired, in line with real world data patterns.
Figure 2.1: Human Capital Isoquants
(a) Supermodular Production in H (b) Submodular Production in H (c) Submodular Production in h
10This assumption is familiar from labor search models (see Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010)). Unlike
Helpman, et al., here differences in hiring patterns are determined by local market conditions.
11See Morrow (2010) for a more detailed interpretation of super- and sub-modularity and implications.
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Although the technology θT is the same for all firms in an industry, firms do not all face the
same regional factor markets. Explicitly modeling these disparate markets emphasizes the role of
regional heterogeneity in supplying human capital inputs to the firm in terms of both price and
quality. This provides not only differences in productivity across regions by technology, but since
industries differ in technology, local market conditions are more or less amenable to particular
industries. We now detail the hiring process, introducing different markets and deriving firms’
optimal hiring to best accommodate these differences.
2.2 Unit Labor Costs by Region and Technology
The total costs of hiring labor depend on the regional wage rates wR, the availability of workers
aR, and the unit cost of labor in region R using technology T , labeled cTR . Since the total number
of each type i hired is NaR,i (1−Ψ(hi)), the total hiring bill is
Total Hiring Costs : N
[
∑
i
wR,iaR,i (1−Ψ(hi))+ f c
T
R
]
. (2.3)
To produce a given vector (H1, . . . ,HS), the firm faces a trade-off between the quantity and
quality of workers hired. For instance, the firm might hire a large number of workers and “cherry
pick” the best matches by choosing high values for h. Alternatively, the firm might save on inter-
viewing costs f by choosing a low number of prospectives N and permissively low values for h.
Local trade offs and the dependence on the regional labor supply characteristics aR and wR is made
explicit by considering the technology and region specific cost functionCT (H|aR,wR), defined by
CT ≡min
N,h
N
[
∑
i
aR,iwR,i (1−Ψ(hi))+ f c
T
R
]
where Hi = NaR,im
T
i
∫ ∞
hi
hdΨ ∀i. (2.4)
Letting µi denote the Lagrange multiplier for each of the S cost minimization constraints, the first
order conditions for {hi} imply µi = wR,i/m
T
i hi, while the choice of N implies
CT (H|aR,wR) = ∑
i
µiHi = N∑wR,iaR,i
∫ ∞
hi
h/hidΨ. (2.5)
Equation (2.5) shows that the multipliers µi are the marginal cost contribution (per skill unit) to Hi
of the last type i worker hired. The cost functionCT implies the unit labor cost of L in region R is
Unit Labor Cost Problem : cTR ≡min
H
CT (H|aR,wR) subject to L= 1. (2.6)
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The unit labor cost function may be solved as
Unit Labor Costs : cTR =
[
∑
i hired
[
aR,i
(
mTi
)
kw1−kR,i / f (k−1)
]θT /βT](βT /θT)/(1−k)
. (2.7)
The trade off between being more selective (high h) and avoiding search costs ( f cTR) is clearly
illustrated by combining Equations (2.3) and (2.5), which shows:
∑
i
aR,iwR,i
∫ ∞
hi
(h−hi)/hidΨ= f c
T
R . (2.8)
The LHS of Equation (2.8) decreases in h, so when a firm faces lower interviewing costs it can
afford to be more selective by increasing h. Conversely, in the presence of high interviewing
costs, the firm optimally “lowers their standards” h to increase the size of their workforce without
interviewing additional workers.12
2.3 Optimal Hiring Patterns
The above reasoning shows the relationship between technology and the optimal choice of worker
types. It is intuitive that if the right tail of the match quality distribution is sufficiently thick, there
are a few excellent matches for each type of worker, so all types are hired.13 Since match quality
follows a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k, expected match quality is E [h] = k/(k−1).
As k → 1 match quality increases, so for k sufficiently close to one, all worker types should be
hired. To be precise, a sufficient condition for a firm to optimally hire every type of worker, stated
as Proposition 1, is that
βT ≡ θT + k− kθT > 0.
This clearly holds for θT ≤ 1, and for θT > 1, the condition is equivalent to k < θT/
(
θT −1
)
.
This induces the isoquants depicted in Figure 2.1c, which illustrates a more standard trade off
between different types of workers, so long as the coordinates are transformed to the space of
hiring standards h.
Proposition 1. If βT > 0 then it is optimal for a firm to hire all types of workers.
Proof. See Appendix.
12The number of times a firm goes to hire workers, N, can be solved as N = 1/ f k. Thus, N is decreasing in both
hiring costs and k. Increases in k imply lower match quality, so that repeatedly screening workers has lower returns.
13This is important, not only for the analytical convenience of avoiding complete specialization in the hiring of
worker types, but also because we find that each region-industry combination hires all types of workers in our data.
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Thus, for βT > 0, all worker types are hired. The optimal share of workers of type i hired by
firm j under technology T in region R, labeled sTR,i j, is fixed by (2.6):
14
sTR,i j = a
θT /βT
R,i w
−k/βT
R,i
(
mTi
)
kθT /βT
(
c˜TR
)θT k/βT
( f (k−1))−θ
T /βT . (2.9)
where c˜TR denotes the unit labor cost function at wages
{
w
k/(k−1)θT
R,i
}
.15 Notice that in (2.6) , unlike
most production models, the factor prices wR are not sufficient to determine the factor shares a firm
will buy. The availability of workers aR is crucial in determining shares hired because costly search
makes firms sensitive to the local supply of each worker type.
2.4 Unit Costs: The Role of Substitution
Equation (2.7) summarizes the cost of one unit of labor L in terms of the Pareto shape parameter
k, the technology θT and regional characteristics aR and wR. In order to solve for total unit costs
(which include non-labor costs), we assume each production function FT is of a Cobb-Douglas
form with constant returns to scale:
FT (M,K,L) =Mα
T
MKα
T
KLα
T
L . (2.10)
It is then straightforward to derive total unit costs from (2.7) and (2.10) as
Total Unit Costs : uTR =
(
rTM/α
T
M
)αTM (rTK/αTK)αTK (cTR/αTL )αTL , (2.11)
where uTR represents the regional component of unit costs for industry T in region R. Within an
industry, productivity then varies across regions as in the following example: if firm 1 in region
R and firm 2 in region R′ face unit labor costs of cTR and c
T
R′ and have the same wage billW , they
will employ labor of L1 =W/cTR and L
2 =W/cTR′ . Thus, if these firms hire the same capital and
material inputs (K,M), then the ratio of their output is
Y 1/Y 2 =
(
Mα
T
MKα
T
KL
αTL
1
)
/
(
Mα
T
MKα
T
KL
αTL
2
)
= (L1/L2)
αTL =
(
cTR′/c
T
R
)αTL .
Industry differences in productivity therefore depend on 1) the ratio of regional labor costs and 2)
the intensity αTL of labor in production. Estimating both allows quantification of regional produc-
tivity differences. However, we first resolve factor prices and firm location in general equilibrium.
14See Supplemental Appendix.
15Formally c˜TR ≡minHC
T
(
H|aR,
{
w
−k/θT (1−k)
R,i
})
subject to L= 1.
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3 Firm Production under Monopolistic Competition
This section combines the insights into firm behavior just developed into a general equilibrium
model of monopolistic competition. Firms, who are ex ante identical, choose among regions to
locate. Key to a firm’s location decision are the expected profits of entry. These profits depend on
1) the distribution of worker types and wages and 2) the competition present from other firms who
enter the region. We characterize production and location choices conditional on local labor mar-
kets. Most strikingly, lower regional production costs attract more firms for any given technology,
which determines the intensity of economic activity. Furthermore, we show an equilibrium wage
vector exists which supports these choices by firms for any distribution of labor endowments. Thus,
endowment distributions as implied by complete labor mobility or migration models are consistent
with our framework.
3.1 Firms and Consumers
Each region R is endowed with a population PR composed of S worker types. Firms may enter any
region R by paying a sunk entry cost Fe. Firms then receive a random cost draw η j ∼G and face a
fixed production cost fe.16 Akin to Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007), firms combine different
types of inputs to produce. Each firm j produces a distinct variety, and in equilibrium a mass of
firmsMTR enter. Entrants with cost draws less than a prohibitively high cost level η
T
R produce. M
T
R
and ηTR together determine the set of varieties available to consumers.
Consumer preferences over varieties j and quantities
{
QTR j
}
take the Dixit-Stiglitz form
UTR ≡U
(
M
T
R ,η
T
R ,Q
T
R
)
=MTR
∫ ηTR
0
(
QTR j
)ρ
dG( j)
in each region and industry, with total utilityU (M,η ,Q)≡ ΠTΠR
(
UTR
)σTR , where σTR are relative
weights put on final goods normalized so that ∑T,Rσ
T
R = 1. As shown in the Appendix, each σ
T
R
has the usual interpretation as the share of income spent on goods from each region and technology
pair (R,T ).17
Firms are the sole sellers of their variety, and thus are monopolists who provide their variety
at a price PTR j. Consumers, in turn, face a vector of prices
{
PTR j
}
, and a particular consumer with
16This follows Melitz (2003). G is assumed to be absolutely continuous with finite mean.
17Note that since the demand for goods from each (R,T ) pair enter preferences multiplicatively, complete special-
ization cannot occur which considerably simplifies the analysis.
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income I has the following demand curve for each variety:
QTR j = I ·
(
PTR jU
T
R /σ
T
R
) 1
ρ−1 /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
) 1
ρ−1M
t
r
∫ η tr
0
((
Ptr,z
)ρ
U tr
) 1
ρ−1
dG(z) . (3.1)
Clearly, even if consumers have different incomes, aggregate demand for variety j corresponds
to that of a representative consumer with income equal to aggregate income, IAgg. Since labor is
supplied inelastically, IAgg is necessarily
IAgg = ∑
R
∑
i
wR,iaR,iPR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Wages of Type i in R
+∑
T
rTMM
T + rTKK
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non−labor Income
. (3.2)
After paying an entry cost of Fe output units, firms know their cost draw, which paired with
regional input markets determine their total unit cost uTR . Firms maximize profits
piTR j
(
PTR j
)
=
(
PTR j−u
T
Rη j
)
QTR j−u
T
R fe
by choosing an optimal price PTR j = u
T
Rη j/ρ , resulting in a markup of 1/ρ over costs. Firms who
cannot make a positive profit do not produce to avoid paying the fixed cost of fe output units. Since
profits decrease in costs, there is a unique cutoff cost draw ηTR which implies zero profits, while
firms with η j < η
T
R produce. As there are no barriers to entry besides the entry cost Fe, firms enter
in every region until expected profits are zero. This yields the
Spatial Zero Profit Condition : E
[
piTR j
]
= Fe, ∀R,T.
It is shown in the Appendix that the cutoff cost draw ηTR depends only on fe, Fe, and G, so there is
a unique cutoff cost that does not vary by region or industry. Having determined firm behavior in
the product market, we now examine input markets.
3.2 Regional Factor Market Clearing
The remaining equilibrium conditions are that input prices guarantee firm input demand exhausts
materials, capital stocks, and each regional pool of workers. To fix expenditure, we assume each
budget share σTR is proportional to PR, so that σ
T
R = σ
TPR for some σT .18 Since production is
Cobb-Douglas, the share of total costs (equal to IAgg) which go to each factor is the factor output
18This assumption is justified by the implication that two regions which have identical skill distributions have the
same wage schedule.
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elasticity, so full resource utilization of materials and capital requires
MT = αTMσ
T IAggP/r
T
M, K
T = αTKσ
T IAggP/r
T
K. (3.3)
where P≡∑RPR is the total population. These two equations capture the allocation of technology
specific resources across regions.
In contrast, effective labor of LTR is produced by each technology in each region. Since the
wage bill LTRc
T
R must receive a share α
T
L of total revenues,
Aggregate Labor Demand : LTR = α
T
L σ
T IAggPR/c
T
R . (3.4)
Embedded in each LTR is the set of workers hired by firms attendant to regional market condi-
tions. The total demand for employees of each type in region R implied by Equation (2.9) must
equal the supply of aR,iPR, yielding the regional resource clearing conditions. Wages are therefore
determined by
aR,iwR,i = ∑
T
σT︸︷︷︸
Industry Share Per Capita
· αTL︸︷︷︸
Labor Share
·Hθ
T
R,i /Σ jH
θT
R, j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type Share
·IAgg ∀R, i. (3.5)
Equation (3.5) shows that type i’s contribution to mean wages, aR,iwR,i, is the sum over income
spent an industry, times labor’s share, times the wages attributable to each type.19
Solving Equation (3.5) requires finding a wage for each worker type in each region that fully
employs all workers. To do so, first note that the resource clearing conditions determine wages,
provided an exogenous vector of unit labor costs
{
cTR
}
, proved in the Appendix:
Lemma. There is a wage functionW that uniquely solves (3.5) given unit labor costs.
Of course, unit labor costs are not exogenous as in the Lemma, but rather depend on endoge-
nous wages {wR,i}. However, the lemma does show that the following mapping:
{wR,i} 7→
Equation 2.7
{
cTR ({wR,i})
}
7→
Lemma
W
({
cTR ({wR,i})
})
,
which starts at one wage vector {wR,i} and ends at another wage vector W is well defined. This
mapping is shown in the Appendix to have a fixed point, which implies
Proposition 2. An equilibrium wage vector exists which clears each regional labor market.
19In equilibrium, the type share is
Hθ
T
R,i /Σ jH
θT
R, j =
(
aR,i
(
mTi
)
kw1−kR,i
)θT /βT
/Σ j
(
aR, j
(
mTj
)
kw1−kR, j
)θT /βT
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3.3 Limited Factor Price Equalization
Since workers are imperfectly substitutable, they induce spillovers within firms, and consequently
are not paid their marginal product.20 Mirroring this, the equation for unit labor costs shows that
regions with different skill distributions, say region R and R′, typically cannot have both cTR = c
T
R′
and wR = wR′ . However, factor price equalization for labor holds in a limited fashion in two ways.
First, Equation (3.4) shows the industry wage bill per capita is equalized, formally
cTRL
T
R/PR = c
T
R′L
T
R′/PR′ for all region pairs
(
R,R′
)
.
Second, summing across types in (3.5) implies
Average Wages : ∑
i
aR,iwR,i = ∑
T
αTL σ
T IAgg,
so average wages are constant across regions. This is summarized as
Proposition 3. Average wages are equalized across regions.
Proposition 3 shows that while our model allows for heterogeneity of wages by worker type,
general equilibrium forces still imply that factor price equalization holds on average.
3.4 Regional Specialization of Firms
Of course, differences in input costs will influence the relative concentration of firms across re-
gions. Since regions may vary substantially in population size P, the most relevant metric is the
number of firms per capita,MTR ·G
(
ηTR
)
/PR. The impact of different regional costs can be clearly
seen by fixing an industry T and considering the ratio of firms per capita in region R versus R′ as
in Equation (3.6):
Firms per Capita, R to R′ :
MTR ·G
(
ηTR
)
/PR
MT
R′
·G
(
ηTR′
)
/PR′
=
uTR′
uTR
=
(
cTR′
cTR
)αTL
(3.6)
Equation (3.6) shows that areas with lower unit labor costs have more firms per capita. Addition-
ally, the larger the share of labor in production, αTL , the more important are differences between
regions. This relationship is summarized as
Proposition 4. Within an industry, regions with lower labor costs have more firms per capita.
The next section lays out a strategy to structurally estimate model parameters.
20Such spillovers are internalized by firms in the model. The extent to which spillovers might also occur across
industries is beyond the scope of this study, however see Moretti (2004) for evidence in the US context.
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4 Estimation Strategy
This section lays out an estimator for the structural model parameters above. The estimator in-
volves two regressions, with a simple intervening computation. The first stage equation determines
firm labor demand, and unlike many approaches, is based on the firm-level shares of workers hired
across regions. The second stage equation uses regional unit labor costs from the first stage to
estimate the production function. Feasibility is illustrated by simulating a data set consistent with
the model above and recovering model primitives accurately with the estimator.
4.1 First Stage Estimation
Equation (2.9) determines the share of each type of workers hired in each region R and industry T .
Taking logs and allowing for errors εi j across firms and types implies
lnsTR,i j =−
k
βT
lnwR,i+
θT
βT
lnaR,i+
θT
βT
k lnmTi +
θT
βT
ln
(
c˜TR
)k
f (k−1)
+ εi j, (4.1)
To estimate this equation we use a combination of type and region dummies.21 To further explain
how regional variation identifies the model we discuss equilibrium hiring predicted by Equation
(4.1) in Appendix D.2.
In order to control for firm characteristics which might influence hiring patterns across worker
types, mTi is allowed to vary with firm observables labeled Controls j:
mTi j ≡ m
T
i · exp
(
Controls jγ
T
i
)
, (4.2)
where γTi is a type-industry specific estimate which influences the value of each worker type in an
industry. The inclusion of Controls j makes type specific human capital vary by firm, and accord-
ingly we denote unit labor costs as cTR j. We now discuss how the first stage estimates are used to
estimate the production function in a second stage.
4.2 Second Stage Estimation
From above we can estimate θT ,k,mTi /m
T
S
,γTi and therefore can estimate regional differences in
unit labor cost functions, ∆ lncTR ≡ E
[
lncTR j|R,T,Controls j
]
−E
[
lncTR j|T
]
. From above, revenues
21We suggest the convention of creating of type and region fixed effects, omitting the highest type fixed effect. The
remaining type coefficients then correspond to the estimates of
(
θT/βT
)
k lnmTi /m
T
S
.
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PTR jQ
T
R j for a firm j satisfy
lnPTR jQ
T
R j = α
T
M lnM j+α
T
K lnK j+α
T
L lnL j− lnρη j. (4.3)
As firm expenditure on labor L · cTR j equals the share α
T
L of revenues P
T
R jQ
T
R j, we have L jc
T
R j =
αTL P
T
R jQ
T
R j and taking differences with the population mean gives
∆ lnL j = ∆ lnP
T
R jQ
T
R j−∆ lnc
T
R j. (4.4)
Taking differences of Equation (4.3) with the population mean and using (4.4) yields
∆ lnPTR jQ
T
R j = α
T
M∆ lnM j+α
T
K∆ lnK j+α
T
L ∆ lnP
T
R jQ
T
R j−α
T
L ∆ lnc
T
R j−∆ lnη j.
Rearranging yields the estimating equation
∆ lnPTR jQ
T
R j =
αTM
1−αTL
∆ lnM j+
αTK
1−αTL
∆ lnK j−
αTL
1−αTL
∆ lncTR j−
1
1−αTL
∆ lnη j. (4.5)
The entire estimation procedure is now briefly recapped.22
4.3 Estimation Procedure Summary
1. Using sTR,i j, the share of workers of type i hired in region R and industry T by firm j, estimate
Equation (4.1) for each industry, using type and region dummies.
2. Recover θ̂T , k̂, m̂Ti /m
T
S
and γ̂Ti . Bootstrap standard errors or use the delta method.
3. Calculate ∆̂ lncTR j from Equation (2.7) using regional data and estimates from Step 2.
4. Estimate Equation (4.5) using ∆̂ lncTR j.
Having laid out both a model detailing the interaction of firm technologies with local market con-
ditions and specifying an estimation strategy, we now apply the method to China. The next section
discusses these data in detail while the sequel presents our results.
22This specification is structural, but treats some model parameters as ancillary. In the Appendix, we illustrate
the estimator by simulating firms which obey the production model specified above and apply these steps. In the
simulation, the two stage estimator explains 97% of the variation in firm output, suggesting that the time savings of
this estimator likely outweigh any gain from a completely specified estimator.
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5 Data
Firm data come from the 2004 Survey of Industrial Firms conducted by the Chinese National
Bureau of Statistics, which includes all state owned enterprises and private enterprises with sales
over 5 million RMB. The data include firm ownership, location, industry, employees by education
level, profit and cash flow statements. Firm capital stock is reported fixed capital, less reported
depreciation while materials are measured by value. For summary statistics, see Appendix E.3.
From the Survey, a sample was constructed of manufacturing firms who report positive net fixed
assets, material inputs, output, value added and wages. Firms with fewer than 8 employees were
excluded as they fall in a different legal regime. The final sample includes 141,464 firms in 284
prefectures and 19 industries at the two digit level.
Regional wage distributions are calculated from the 0.5% sample of the 2005 China Population
Census. The census contains the education level by prefecture of residence, occupation, industry
code, monthly income and weekly hours of work. We restrict the sample to employees age 15 to
65 who report positive wages and hours of work. The regional wage distribution is recovered from
the average annual income of employees by education using census data.23
In addition, GIS data from the China Data Center at the University of Michigan locates firms
at the county and prefecture level. Port data is provided by GIS data and supplemented by inland
port data from the World Port Index. These data provide controls for urban status, distance to port
and Economic Zone status.
Figure 5.1a illustrates the prefectures of China, which we define as regions from the perspective
of the model above. Prefectures illustrated by a darker shade in the Figure operate under substan-
tially different government policies and objectives. These regions typically have large minority
populations or historically distinct conditions, with the majority declared as autonomous regions,
and have idiosyncratic regulations, development, and educational policies.24 We restrict attention
to the lighter shaded regions of Figure 5.1a, preserving 284 prefectures displaying distinct labor
market conditions.25
23While firm data is from 2004 and census data is from 2005, firm skill mix is remarkably stable over time: Ilmakun-
nas and Ilmakunnas (2011) find the standard deviation of plant-level education years is very stable from 1995-2004
in Finland, and Parrotta, Pozzoli, and Pytlikova (2011) find that a firm-level education diversity index was roughly
constant over a decade in Denmark.
24See the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China document cited.
25In 2005, China was composed of thirty three Provinces and we exclude the five Autonomous Provinces and one
predominantly minority Non-Autonomous Province.
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Figure 5.1: Chinese Prefectures
(a) Chinese Prefectures (b) Average Monthly Income of Employees (2005)
5.1 Regional Variation
Key to our analysis is regional variation in skill distribution and wages. Here we briefly discuss
both, with further details in Appendix E. Monthly incomes vary substantially across China as
illustrated in Figure 5.1b. This is due to both the composition of skills (proxied by education)
across regions and the rates paid to these skills. Figure 5.2 contrasts educational distributions of
the labor force. Figure 5.2(a) shows those with a Junior High School education (the mandated level
in China), while Figure 5.2(b) displays those with a Junior College or higher level of attainment.
Figure 5.2: Low and High Educational Attainment Across China (2005)
(a) % Labor Force with ≤ Junior High School (b) % Labor Force with ≥ Junior College
The differing composition of input markets across China in 2004-2005 stem frommany factors,
including the dynamic nature of China’s rapidly growing economy, targeted economic policies
and geographic agglomeration of industries across China.26 Faber (2012) finds that expansion of
China’s National Trunk Highway System displaced economic activity from counties peripheral
to the System. Similarly, Baum-Snow, Brandt, Henderson, Turner, and Zhang (2012) show that
mass transit systems in China have increased the population density in city centers, while radial
26We consider regional price variation at a fixed point in time. Reallocation certainly occurs and is very important
in explaining dynamics (e.g. Borjas (2003)) but are outside the scope of this paper.
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highways around cities have dispersed population and industrial activity. An overview of Chinese
economic policies is provided by Defever and Riano (2012), who quantify their impact on firms.
Of particular interest for labor markets are substantial variation in wages and the attendant
migration this induces. The quantitative extent to which labor market migration has been stymied
by the hukou system of internal passports is not well studied, although its impact has likely lessened
since 2000.27 Given that rural to urban migration typifies the pattern of structural transformation
underway, we control for rural and urban effects for each type of worker below. Nonetheless, it
remains unclear to what degree the hukou system alters labor flows under the present system. In
particular, high income and highly educated workers can more easily move among urban regions
as local governments are likely to approve their migration applications (Chan, Liu, and Yang,
1999). It therefore seems likely that the size of labor markets accessible to workers is extremely
heterogeneous. Given what little is known about the actual determinants of migration in China,
modeling firm decisions when faced with dynamically changing input markets is an interesting
avenue for further work.
5.2 Worker Types
Our definition of workers is people between ages 15 and 65 who work outside the agricultural
sector and are not employers, self-employed, or in a family business. Our definition of distinct,
imperfectly substitutable worker types is based primarily on formal schooling attained. Census
data from 2005 shows that the average years of schooling for workers in China ranges from 8.5 to
11.8 years across provinces, with sparse postgraduate education. The most common level of formal
education is at the Junior High School level or below. Reflecting substantial wage differences by
gender within that group, we define Type 1 workers as Junior High School or Below: Female and
Type 2 workers as Junior High School or Below: Male.28 Completion of Senior High School
defines Type 3 and completion of Junior College or higher education defines Type 4.
Having discussed the data, we now apply the estimation procedure developed above.
6 Estimation Results
This section reports our estimation results, then turns to a discussion of the quantitative labor cost
and productivity differences accounted for by local market conditions in China. The section con-
27The Hukou system and its reform in the late 1990s are well explained in Chan and Buckingham (2008). The per-
sistence of such a stratified system has engendered deep set social attitudes which likely affect economic interactions
between Hukou groups, see Afridi, Li, and Ren (2012).
28Differentiation of gender for low skill labor is especially important in developing countries as a variety of influ-
ences result in imperfect substitutability across gender. Bernhofen and Brown (2011) distinguish between skilled male
labor, unskilled male labour and female labour and find that the factor prices across these types differ substantially.
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tinues by testing the firm location implications of the model, finding broad support that economic
activity locates where estimated unit labor costs are lower. Finally, we compare estimation results
of our unit cost based method with one approach common in the literature, which assumes that
labor types are perfectly substitutable.
6.1 Estimates of Market Conditions and Production Technologies
The full first stage regression results for several manufacturing industries in China are presented
in Tables A.3 and A.4 of Appendix C. A representative set of estimates for the General Machines
industry are presented in Table 1. The first box in Table 1, labeled Primary Variables, are con-
sistent with the model. Though values for the coefficients
(
θT/βT
)
lnmi/m4 are not specified by
the model, their estimated values do increase in type in Table 1, which is consonant with formal
education increasing worker output.
Table 1: First Stage Results: General Machines
Primary Variables ln(%Hired) Firm Controls
ln(wR,i) -2.687*** m1 ∗Urban Dummy -1.384***
ln(aR,i) 1.794*** m2 ∗Urban Dummy -0.980***
m1 (≤Junior HS: Female) -10.170*** m3 ∗Urban Dummy 0.427***
m2 (≤Junior HS: Male) -6.171*** m4 ∗Urban Dummy 2.336***
m3 (Senior High School) -3.180*** m1∗% Foreign Equity -2.448***
m2∗% Foreign Equity -1.864***
m3∗% Foreign Equity 0.311***
Regional Controls m4∗% Foreign Equity 3.847***
m1∗% Non-Ag Hukou -5.957*** m1 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.934***
m2∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.072*** m2 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.403***
m3∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.218*** m3 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.143***
m4∗% Non-Ag Hukou -7.026*** m4 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.351***
Observations: 62,908. R2 : 0.139 Includes Regional Fixed Effects
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
The remaining two boxes include regional controls from the Census and firm level controls
from the manufacturing survey. The regional controls are by prefecture, and include the percent-
age of each type with a non-agricultural Hukou. The firm level controls include the share of foreign
equity, the age of the firm, and whether the firm is in an urban area. Inclusion of controls for aver-
age worker age, which control for accumulated skill or vintage human capital, do not appreciably
alter the results. Other controls which did not appreciably alter the results include State Ownership
and the percentage of migrants in a region.
These first stage estimates are interesting in themselves, as the model then implies the unit cost
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function for labor by region. The dispersion of estimated unit labor costs in the General Purpose
Machine industry are depicted in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Geographic Dispersion of Unit Labor Costs: General Machines
The model primitives of our two stage estimation procedure across industries are summarized
in Tables 2 and 3. Standard errors are calculated using a bootstrap procedure stratified on industry
and region, presented in the Appendix. Table 2 displays the estimated model primitives, showing a
range of significantly different technologies θT and match quality distributions through k. Table 3
shows the second stage estimation results, where the regional unit labor costs are calculated using
regional data and the first stage estimates.
Table 2: Model Primitive Estimates
Industry k θ Industry k θ
Beverage 2.12 (.38) 1.24 (.08) Paper 6.25 (3.8) 0.73 (.11)
Electrical 2.60 (.15) 1.22 (.02) Plastic 3.51 (.29) 1.08 (.03)
Food 1.59 (.36) 1.28 (.13) Printing 3.93 (.60) 1.04 (.04)
General Machines 2.50 (.14) 1.22 (.03) PC & AV 2.21 (.14) 1.41 (.04)
Iron & Steel 3.21 (.56) 1.00 (.06) Rubber 1.63 (.61) 1.15 (.19)
Leather & Fur 2.15 (.70) 0.76 (.14) Specific Machines 1.63 (.18) 1.43 (.07)
Precision Tools 2.34 (.18) 1.43 (.05) Textile 3.73 (.36) 0.95 (.03)
Metal Products 3.20 (.24) 1.10 (.03) Transport 1.26 (.24) 1.38 (.13)
Non-ferrous Metal 2.89 (.38) 1.15 (.05) Wood 1.52 (.22) 1.62 (.17)
Non-metal Products 2.02 (.16) 1.25 (.04) Standard Errors reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: Second Stage Estimates
Industry αL αK αM Industry αL αK αM
Beverage .13 (.05) .10 (.01) .70 (.04) Paper .18 (.36) .14 (.03) .53 (.28)
Electrical .25 (.01) .14 (.01) .47 (.01) Plastic .27 (.04) .14 (.01) .41 (.02)
Food .14 (.08) .09 (.01) .70 (.06) Printing .09 (.06) .22 (.01) .55 (.03)
General Machines .17 (.02) .12 (.01) .60 (.01) PC & AV .16 (.01) .21 (.01) .43 (.01)
Iron & Steel .40 (.06) .07 (.01) .48 (.05) Rubber .06 (.15) .13 (.02) .63 (.10)
Leather & Fur .10 (.11) .13 (.02) .59 (.07) Specific Machines .10 (.03) .16 (.01) .55 (.02)
Precision Tools .20 (.01) .16 (.01) .43 (.01) Textile .12 (.05) .11 (.01) .61 (.03)
Metal Products .24 (.01) .14 (.01) .46 (.01) Transport .04 (.03) .15 (.01) .65 (.02)
Non-ferrous Metal .40 (.03) .08 (.01) .43 (.02) Wood .22 (.11) .10 (.02) .56 (.08)
Non-metal Products .20 (.02) .07 (.01) .61 (.02) Standard Errors reported in parentheses.
While the capital coefficients may seem low, they are not out of line with other estimates which
specifically account for material inputs (e.g. Javorcik (2004)). For the specific case of China, there
are few studies estimating production coefficients.29 The most comparable study is Fleisher and
Wang (2004) who find microeconomic estimates for αK in the range of .40 to .50 (which does
not differentiate between capital and materials) and these estimates compare favorably with the
combined estimates of αK +αM in Table 3.
6.2 Implied Productivity Differences Across Firms
Table 4 quantifies the implied differences in unit labor costs and productivity across regions. The
cTR column displays the interquartile (75%/25%) unit labor cost ratios by industry, where unit labor
costs have been calculated according to the model. The uTR column contains the differences in
productivity implied by unit labor costs as laid out in Section 2.4, taking into account substitution
into non-labor inputs. For example, consider two firms in General Machines at the 25th and 75th
unit labor cost percentile. If both firms have the same wage bill, the labor (L) available to the lower
cost firm is 1.41 times greater than the higher cost firm. From Table 3 above, the estimated share
of wages in production is αTL = .17, so the lower cost firm will produce 1.41
.17 = 1.06 times as
much output as the higher cost firm, holding all else constant.
29Though not directly comparable, macroeconomic level estimates include Chow (1993) and Ozyurt (2009) who
find much higher capital coefficients. These studies do not account for materials.
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Table 4: Intraindustry Unit Labor Cost and Productivity Ratios
cTR u
T
R c
T
R u
T
R
Industry 75/25 75/25 Industry 75/25 75/25
Beverage 1.51 1.06 Paper 1.66 1.07
Electrical 1.38 1.08 Plastic 1.35 1.09
Food 1.81 1.09 Printing 1.37 1.03
General Machines 1.41 1.06 PC & AV 1.44 1.06
Iron & Steel 1.34 1.13 Rubber 2.16 1.04
Leather & Fur 1.92 1.04 Specific Machines 1.99 1.08
Precision Tools 1.80 1.13 Textile 1.37 1.04
Metal Products 1.33 1.07 Transport 4.01 1.04
Non-ferrous Metal 1.45 1.17 Wood 1.47 1.10
Non-metal Products 1.42 1.08
Table 4 indicates that the range of total unit costs faced by firms within the same industry
are indeed substantial, even after explicitly taking into account the technology θT and the ability
to substitute across several types of local workers. However, the second stage estimates indicate
these differences are attenuated by substitution into capital and materials. Thus, while differences
in regional markets indicate an interquartile range of 30-80% in unit cost differences, substitution
into other factors reduces this range to between 3-17%.30
Table 5 examines the variance of productivity across industries under our unit cost method
and under an approach estimating output by a Cobb-Douglas combination of capital, materials
and the number of each worker type. Table 5 also shows the average percentage that unexplained
productivity is reduced per firm under the unit labor cost method.
Table 5: Percentage of Productivity Explained by Unit Cost Method
Unit Four Avg % Unit Four Avg %
Industry Cost σ2 Types σ2 Reduced Industry Cost σ2 Types σ2 Reduced
Beverage .41 .54 .18 Paper .36 .65 .30
Electrical .40 .67 .27 Plastic .22 .64 .43
Food .37 .61 .28 Printing .49 .56 .10
General Machines .44 .59 .16 PC & AV .73 .94 .21
Iron & Steel .32 .46 .19 Rubber .55 .56 .08
Leather & Fur .23 .66 .43 Specific Machines .51 .61 .10
Precision Tools .45 .46 .07 Textile .39 .45 .11
Metal Products .48 .69 .22 Transport .58 .59 .04
Non-ferrous Metal .27 .43 .24 Wood .26 .45 .27
Non-metal products .44 .56 .15
30Most models used in production estimation assume perfect labor substitutability. Such models imply that, condi-
tional on wages, the local composition of the workforce is irrelevant for hirin. Our approach is sensitive to local factor
supply and an empirical comparison with other models is presented in Appendix C.2.
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Since firms locate freely, the model predicts that these substantial cost differences drive eco-
nomic activity towards more advantageous locations, which we now examine.
6.3 Firm Location
Per capita volumes of economic activity across regions are determined by Equation (3.6), which
states that relatively lower industry labor costs should attract relatively more firms to a region.
Table 7 summarizes estimates of this relationship, controlling for regional distance to the near-
est port (weighted by the share of value added in a region). Whenever the relationship between
value added and labor costs is statistically significant, the relationship is negative, in line with the
model.31 While the point estimates vary, the median significant estimates is about -.8, indicating a
10% increase in unit labor costs is associated with an 8% decrease in value added per capita.
Table 6: Determinants of Regional (Log) Value Added per Capita
Std 100 km Std Std
Industry ln
(
cTR
)
Err to Port Err Const Err Obs R2
Beverage -0.696b (.274) -0.122 (.200) 18.96a (3.36) 155 .03
Electrical -0.057 (.403) -1.567a (.259) 11.98b (4.80) 166 .22
Food -0.553b (.229) -0.397b (.179) 15.49a (2.15) 171 .04
General Machines -0.705c (.400) -1.314a (.340) 19.68a (4.86) 195 .11
Iron & Steel -1.245b (.565) -0.576a (.194) 16.30a (2.22) 160 .06
Leather & Fur -1.255a (.249) -1.028b (.421) 25.81a (3.05) 89 .27
Precision Tools -0.267 (.300) -1.135b (.432) 13.13a (3.39) 68 .07
Metal Products -0.236 (.463) -1.239a (.260) 13.24a (4.86) 157 .14
Non-ferrous Metal -1.977a (.544) -0.468c (.275) 27.29a (4.57) 139 .10
Non-metal Products -0.827a (.290) -0.910a (.155) 20.89a (3.38) 259 .11
Paper -0.911a (.197) -0.320 (.246) 20.04a (2.08) 159 .12
Plastic -0.556 (.352) -1.406a (.221) 16.86a (3.99) 159 .22
Printing 0.103 (.655) -0.123 (.257) 8.54 (7.12) 98 .01
PC & AV -0.212 (.366) -0.741b (.333) 13.92a (4.60) 90 .04
Rubber -0.424c (.219) -0.470 (.398) 14.06a (2.07) 79 .06
Specific Machines -0.316c (.184) -0.680a (.194) 14.74a (2.28) 167 .07
Textile -0.934a (.273) -1.168a (.153) 19.70a (2.44) 186 .18
Transport -0.105 (.099) -1.119a (.253) 12.69a (1.30) 168 .10
Wood -2.234a (.338) -1.038a (.267) 47.02a (5.63) 133 .20
Note: a, b and c denote 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively.
31These results are robust if distance is unweighted, and to the inclusion of Economic Zone status.
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7 Conclusion
This paper examines the importance of local supply characteristics in determining firm input usage
and productivity. To do so, a theory and empirical method are developed to identify firm input
demand across industries and heterogeneous labor markets. The model derives labor demand as
driven by the local distribution of wages and available skills. Firm behavior in general equilibrium
is derived, and determines firm location as a function of regional costs. This results in an estimator
which can be easily implemented in two steps. The first step exploits differences in firm hiring
patterns across distinct regional factor markets to recover firm labor demand by type. The second
step uses the first stage to introduce local labor costs into production function estimation. Both
steps characterize the impact of local market conditions on firm behavior through recovery of
model primitives. This is of particular interest when explaining the relative productivity or location
of firms, especially in settings where local characteristics are known to be highly dissimilar.
Our empirical strategy combines information from the Chinese manufacturing, population cen-
sus, and geographic data from the mid-2000s. Our estimates imply an interquartile difference in
labor costs of 30 to 80 and productivity differences of 3 to 17 percent. The results suggest that team
technologies combined with favorable factor market conditions explain substantial differences in
firm input use and productivity. This shows that modeling a firm’s local environment yields sub-
stantial insights into production patterns that are quantitatively important.
The importance of local factor markets for understanding firm behavior suggests new dimen-
sions for policy analysis. For instance, regions with labor markets which generate lower unit labor
costs tend to attract higher levels of firm activity within an industry. As unit labor costs depend
not only on the level of wages, but rather the distribution of wages and worker types that represent
substitution options, this yields a more varied view of how educational policy or flows of different
worker types could impact firms. Taken as a whole, our results show that policy changes which
influence the composition of regional labor markets will have sizable effects on firm behavior,
productivity and location.
Finally, nothing precludes the application of this paper’s approach beyond China, and it is
suitable for analyzing regions which exhibit a high degree of labor market heterogeneity. As the
model affords the interpretation of trade between countries which have high barriers to immigration
but low barriers to capital and input flows, it is also suitable for analyzing firm behavior across
national borders. Further work could leverage or extend the approach of combining firm, census
and geographic data to better understand the role of local factor markets on firm behavior.
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Appendix
The organization of the Appendix is as follows: Section A contains proofs of results discussed
in the main text. Section B evaluates the efficacy of the reduced form model estimator. Section
C contains more detail regarding model estimates. Three supplemental appendices are provided
for online publication: Section D contains additional details on the model solution and properties.
Section E contains summary statistics. Section F contains supplemental empirical results.
A Further Model Discussion and Proofs
A.1 Optimality of Hiring All Worker Types
Proposition. If βT > 0 then it is optimal for a firm to hire all types of workers.
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Proof. Let cTR denote a firm’s unit labor cost when all worker types are hired, and cˇ
T
R the unit labor
cost if a subset of types T ⊂ {1, . . .S} is hired. For the result, we require that cTR ≤ cˇ
T
R for all T.
Considering a firm’s cost minimization problem when T are the only types available shows with
Equation (2.7) that
cˇTR =
[
∑
i∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
)
kw1−kR,i / f (k−1)
]θT /βT](βT /θT)/(1−k)
.
Considering then that
cTR/cˇ
T
R =
[
1+
(
∑
i/∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
)
kw1−kR,i
]θT /βT
/∑
i∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
)
kw1−kR,i
]θT /βT)](βT /θT)/(1−k)
,
clearly cTR ≤ cˇ
T
R so long as β
T/θT (1− k)≤ 0, which holds for βT > 0 since k > 1.
A.2 Existence of Regional Wages to Clear Input Markets
What is required is to exhibit a wage vector {wR,i} that ensures Equation (3.5) holds. Since all
prices are nominal, WLOG we normalize IAgg = 1 in the following.
Lemma. There is a wage function that uniquely solves (3.5) given unit labor costs.
Proof. Formally, we need to exhibitW such that
aR,i =WR,i
({
cT
′
R′
})−1
∑
t
α tLσ
t
(
ctR
)k/β t−1WR,i
({
cT
′
R′
})1−k
aR,i (m
t
i)
k
f (k−1)

θ t/β t
∀R, i.
Fix
{
cT
′
R′
}
and define hR,i (x)≡∑t α
t
Lσ
t (ctR)
k/β t−1 (
x1−kaR,i (m
t
i)
k/ f (k−1)
)θ t/β t
, gR,i (x)≡ aR,ix.
For the result we require a unique x s.t. gR,i (x) = hR,i (x). gR,i is strictly increasing and ranges from
0 to ∞, while hR,i (x) is strictly decreasing, and ranges from ∞ to 0, so x exists and is unique.
Lemma. The function
{
cTR ◦W
({
cTR
})}
, where cTR is the unit cost function of Equation (2.7), has
a fixed point
{
ĉTR
}
and soW
({
ĉTR
})
is a solution to Equation (3.5).
Proof. We first show that any equilibrium wage vector must lie in a strictly positive, compact set
×R,i
[
wR,i,wR,i
]
. From (3.5), Hθ
T
R,i /Σ jH
θT
R, j ∈ [0,1] so wR,i ≤ wR,i ≡ ∑t α
t
Lσ
t/aR,i. Let
bR ≡min
i
∑
t
α tLσ
t
(
aR,i
(
mti
)
k
)θ t/β t
/∑
i
[
aR,i
(
mti
)
k
]θ t/β t
aR,i,
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and we will show that a lower bound for equilibrium wages is wR ≡
[
bR, . . . , bR
]
for each R.
Consider that forW evaluated at
{
cTR (wR)
}
,
WR,i = ∑
t
α tLσ
t
(
aR,i
(
mti
)
k (WR,i/wR)
1−k
)θ t/β t
/∑
i
[
aR,i
(
mti
)
k
]θ t/β t
aR,i. (A.1)
Evaluating Equation (A.1), if WR,i ≤ wR then WR,i ≥ wR, and otherwise, WR,i ≥ wR so {wR} is
a lower bound forW
({
cTR (wR)
})
. Since necessarilyW
({
cTR (wˆR)
})
= {wˆR},W is increasing in{
cTR
}
, and cTR (wR) is increasing inwR, we have {wˆR}=W
({
cTR (wˆR)
})
≥W
({
cTR (wR)
})
≥{wR}.
In conclusion, all equilibrium wages must lie in ×R,i
[
wR,i,wR,i
]
.
Now define a strictly positive, compact domain for
{
cTR
}
, ×R
[
cTR ,c
T
R
]
, by
cTR ≡ inf
×i[wR,i,wR,i]
cTR (wR) = c
T
R (wR) , c
T
R ≡ sup
×i[wR,i,wR,i]
cTR (wR) = c
T
R (wR) .
Now consider the mapping C
({
cTR
})
≡
{
cTR ◦W
({
cTR
})}
on ×R
[
cTR ,c
T
R
]
, which is continuous on
this domain. By above, WR,i
({
cTR
})
≤ wR,i for each R, i so C
({
cTR
})
≤
{
cTR
}
. Also by above,
C
({
cTR
})
≥
{
cTR ◦W
({
cTR (wR)
})}
≥
{
cTR ({wR})
}
=
{
cTR
}
. Thus C maps ×R
[
cTR ,c
T
R
]
into itself
and by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed point
{
ĉTR
}
, which impliesW
({
ĉTR
})
is
an equilibrium wage vector.
B Model Simulation and Estimator Viability
A model simulation was constructed using parameters given in Table A.1. In the simulation, firms
maximize profits conditional on local market conditions, and applying the estimator above pro-
duces Tables A.2a and A.2b. The Estimate column contains results while the model values are
reported in the Predicted column. The estimates are very close to the predicted values. Figure A.1
further confirms this by plotting the simulated and predicted differences in the share of workers
hired. For ease of comparison, Figure A.1 plots regional frequencies along the horizontal axis and
(linearly) normalized wages for each worker type. As the Figure suggests, the R2 in both cases are
high: .99 for the first stage and .97 for the second stage.
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Figure A.1: Simulation Fit
Table A.1: Simulation details
Variable Description Value
θT Technological parameter. 2
k Pareto shape parameter. 1.5
{mi} Human capital shifters. {4,8,12,16,20}
{wR,i} Regional wages by type. ∼LogNormal µ = (12,24,36,48,60), σ = 1/3.
{aR,i} Regional type frequencies. ∼LogNormal µ = (.4, .3, .15, .1, .05), σ = 1/3,
scaled so that frequencies sum to one.
K, M Firm capital and materials. ∼LogNormal µ = 1, σ = 1.
L Level of L employed by firm. Profit maximizing given K, M and region.
αM,αK ,αL Production Parameters. αM = 1/6, αK = 1/3, αL = 1/2.
Control Misc variable for output. ∼LogNormal µ = 0, σ = 1.
Coeff Exponent on Control. Control Coeff= pi .{
ω j
}
Firm idiosyncratic wage costs. ∼LogNormal µ = 0, σ = .1.
Sample: 200 regions with 20 firms per region, with errors ∼LogNormal(µ = 0, σ = 1/2).
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Table A.2: Simulation Results
(a) Simulation First Stage Estimates: Technology and Human Capital
Variable Parameter Estimate Std Err Predicted
{lnaR,i}
(
θT/β T
)
3.912 .0019 4
{lnwR,i}
(
−k/β T
)
-2.922 .0021 -3
Dummy (Type = 1)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm1/m5) -9.376 .0057 -9.657
Dummy (Type = 2)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm2/m5) -5.295 .0045 -5.498
Dummy (Type = 3)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm3/m5) -2.950 .0031 -3.065
Dummy (Type = 4)
(
θT/β T
)
k (lnm4/m5) -1.274 .0024 -1.339
(b) Simulation Second Stage Estimates: Production Parameters
Variable Parameter Estimate Std Err Predicted
lnM αM/(1−αL) .3298 .0079 .3333
lnK αK/(1−αL) .6680 .0080 .6667
lncRT −αL/(1−αL) -.9303 .0748 -1
Control Control Coeff 3.148 .0079 3.141
C Model Estimates
32
Table
A
.3:
F
irstS
tage
E
stim
ates
I
Electrical General Iron & Leather Precision Metal Non-ferrous
Industry Beverage Equip Food Machines Steel & Fur Equipment Products Metal
Dependent Variable: ln(%type)
ln(wR,i) -1.808a -2.977a -0.870 -2.687a -2.150a -0.708c -4.517a -3.174a -3.096a
ln(aR,i) 1.673a 1.878a 1.489a 1.794a 1.018a 0.636a 3.358a 1.439a 1.627a
m1 (≤Junior HS: Fem) -8.447a -9.491a -3.186 -10.170a 7.190a -2.052 -13.450a -5.800a -1.189
m2 (≤Junior HS: Male) -5.947c -7.181a -1.504 -6.171a 12.370a -1.089 -11.160a -2.176c 3.768c
m3 (Senior High School) -2.470 -4.475a 1.123 -3.180a 14.210a -2.058c -4.100b -0.758 6.119a
m1∗% Non-Ag Hukou 0.837 -7.619a -2.341b -5.957a -2.373c -4.544a -7.142a -6.038a -4.591a
m2∗% Non-Ag Hukou 0.306 -3.272a -1.880 -3.072a -1.355 -2.882c -3.957c -1.805b -0.370
m3∗% Non-Ag Hukou -1.102 -0.593 -0.837 -3.218a -2.394a -1.606b 0.315 -1.104b -0.903
m4∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.913 -4.572a -0.426 -7.026a 10.130a -8.496a 1.793 -2.491b 3.403
m1 ∗Urban Dummy -0.271 -1.379
a -1.462a -1.384a -1.393a -0.0822 -1.032a -1.408a -1.188a
m2 ∗Urban Dummy -0.007 -0.991
a -1.085a -0.980a -0.585a -0.128 -1.176a -0.533a -0.601a
m3 ∗Urban Dummy 0.286
c 0.139b 0.175 0.427a 0.503a 0.220c -0.249 0.247a 0.108
m4 ∗Urban Dummy 2.212
a 1.513a 1.743a 2.336a 3.275a 0.683a 1.053a 2.147a 1.791a
m1∗% Foreign Equity 0.531a 1.030a 0.841a 0.934a 0.751a -0.107 1.952a 0.876a 1.366a
m2∗% Foreign Equity 0.422a 0.678a 0.661a 0.403a 0.354a -0.0680 1.840a 0.335a 0.432a
m3∗% Foreign Equity 0.106 0.259a 0.197b 0.143a 0.083 0.257a 0.574a 0.145a 0.093
m4∗% Foreign Equity -0.005 0.232a 0.015 0.351a -0.069 0.249 0.033 -0.150 0.589a
m1 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -2.803a -0.215 -0.983a -2.448a -2.160a 0.113 0.727b -0.627a -2.156a
m2 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -2.290a -0.547a -0.494c -1.864a -1.662a -0.190b 0.319 -0.788a -1.838a
m3 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.714a -0.114 0.016 0.311a 0.862a 0.198 -0.510b 0.417a 0.695a
m4 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 2.840a 1.621a 2.301a 3.847a 5.656a 3.133a 0.279 3.488a 4.413a
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,900 48,960 15,228 62,908 18,704 19,408 10,808 42,744 14,428
R-squared 0.124 0.117 0.098 0.139 0.168 0.208 0.246 0.124 0.145
Note: a, b and c denote 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively.
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Table
A
.4:
F
irstS
tage
E
stim
ates
II
Other PC & AV Specific Transport
Industry Non-metal Paper Plastic Printing Equipment Rubber Machines Textile Equip Wood
Dependent Variable: ln(%type)
ln(wR,i) -1.693a -1.542a -3.324a -3.491a -3.371a -0.854 -1.260a -2.230a -0.372 -1.220b
ln(aR,i) 1.664a 0.332b 1.321a 1.212a 2.785a 1.267a 1.961a 0.830a 1.477a 2.286a
m1 (≤Junior HS: Fem) -7.246a -3.469c -7.881a -5.515b -13.770a -1.997 -10.130a 1.588 -6.326a -10.890a
m2 (≤Junior HS: Male) -3.128a -0.645 -4.596a -2.913 -11.970a 0.188 -4.811a 2.703b -3.359b -9.086a
m3 (Senior High School) -0.808 0.076 -2.657b -1.849 -7.325a 2.347 -1.515 3.468a -1.290 -6.106b
m1∗% Non-Ag Hukou -2.750a -6.210a -6.682a -5.979a -7.176a -5.162a -4.763a -6.271a -5.279a -0.301
m2∗% Non-Ag Hukou -1.750a -6.148a -4.710a -4.386a -5.210a -2.819c -4.295a -5.555a -3.153a -0.308
m3∗% Non-Ag Hukou -2.198a -3.251a -2.685a -1.835b 0.597 -3.361a -1.463a -3.264a -1.039b -2.549a
m4∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.926a -7.690a -7.074a -4.440c -3.291a -2.211 -2.447 -4.025a -3.450b -13.060a
m1 ∗Urban Dummy -1.333
a -0.691a -1.057a -1.711a -1.881a -0.819a -1.597a -0.650a -1.130a -1.630a
m2 ∗Urban Dummy -0.834
a -0.338b -0.590a -1.170a -1.619a -0.603a -1.234a -0.421a -0.714a -0.720a
m3 ∗Urban Dummy 0.250
a 0.350a 0.272a 0.198 -0.512a -0.035 0.216b 0.285a 0.233a 0.129
m4 ∗Urban Dummy 2.570
a 2.644a 2.413a 2.251a 0.902a 2.211a 1.924a 2.709a 1.381a 3.331a
m1∗% Foreign Equity 0.834a 0.407a 0.877a 0.193 1.340a 0.620a 1.588a 0.214a 1.023a 0.415a
m2∗% Foreign Equity 0.244a 0.153c 0.361a -0.029 1.072a 0.234c 0.750a 0.202a 0.547a 0.176
m3∗% Foreign Equity 0.028 0.039 0.048 0.242a 0.294a 0.002 0.169a 0.137a 0.129a -0.142
m4∗% Foreign Equity -0.310a -0.012 0.000 0.176 -0.160b -0.191 0.097 0.442a 0.168b 0.197
m1 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -1.016a -1.899a -0.857a -0.247 0.310 -0.576 -1.601a -0.384a -1.266a -0.423
m2 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -0.768a -0.819a -0.773a -0.402 0.223 -0.242 -1.675a -0.058 -1.171a 0.066
m3 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.105 0.457a 0.398a -0.023 -0.049 0.319 0.100 0.445a 0.588a -0.468
m4 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 3.429a 4.850a 3.776a 3.143a 0.321a 2.577a 1.629a 4.391a 2.298a 3.850a
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 61,388 22,792 36,940 13,528 26,796 8,848 31,264 73,168 34,528 14,516
R-squared 0.150 0.164 0.130 0.107 0.188 0.120 0.177 0.221 0.129 0.245
Note: a, b and c denote 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively.
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C.1 Residual Comparison: Unit Labor Costs vs Substitutable Labor
Of particular interest for work on productivity are the residuals remaining after the second esti-
mation step, which are often interpreted as idiosyncratic firm productivity. Figure A.1 contrasts
unexplained productivity (estimation residuals) when unit labor costs are used with estimates that
measure labor by including the employment of each worker type. Examining the 45 degree line
also plotted in the Figure, a general pattern emerges: above average firms under the employment
measure are slightly less productive under the unit cost approach, while below average firms are
more productive. This suggests that a more detailed analysis of the role of local factor markets
may substantially alter interpretation of differences in firm productivity.
Figure A.1: Productivity: Unit Labor Costs vs Total Employment (General Machines)
C.2 Comparison with Conventional Labor Measures
The estimates above reflect a procedure using regional variation to recover the unit cost of labor.
Often, such information is not incorporated into production estimation. Instead, the number of
employees or total wage bill are used to capture the effective labor available to a firm. The mean
of the second stage estimates using these labor measures are contrasted with our method in Table
A.5 (full results in Table A.13 of the Supplemental Appendix). The production coefficients using
the total wage bill or total employment are very similar, reflecting the high correlation of these
variables. However, both measures mask regional differences in factor markets. Once local sub-
stitution patterns are taken into account explicitly, substantial differences emerge.32 Most notably,
the capital share tends to be higher under our approach, while the labor share is substantially lower.
32The residuals remaining after the second estimation step, which are often interpreted as idiosyncratic firm pro-
ductivity, are compared in Appendix C.1.
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Table A.5: Second Stage Estimates vs Homogeneous Labor Estimates
Unit Labor Cost Total Wage Bill Total Employment
αL αK αM αL αK αM αL αK αM
Average 0.18 0.13 0.55 0.29 0.09 0.54 0.28 0.09 0.58
Pushing this comparison further, Table A.12 predicts the propensity to export of firms by resid-
ual firm productivity. The first column shows the results under our unit cost method. The second
and third columns show the results when labor is measured as perfectly substitutable (either by em-
ployment of each type or wages). Note that in all cases, regional and industry effects are controlled
for. The Table illustrates that productivity estimates which account for regional factor markets are
almost twice as important in predicting exports as the other measures. Section F.2 of the Appendix
shows that similar results hold when examining sales growth and three year survival rate: produc-
tivity under the unit cost approach is more important in predicting firm performance, suggesting
the other measures conflate the role of advantageous factor markets with productivity.
Table A.6: Explaining Propensity to Export with Productivity
Export Dummy (2005)
Productivity under Unit Cost method 0.0242***
(0.00393)
Productivity under L = 4 Types 0.0131***
(0.00241)
Productivity under L = Wage Bill 0.0168***
(0.00252)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 141,409 141,409 141,409
R-squared 0.202 0.201 0.202
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
D Supplemental Derivations
D.1 Derivation of Region-Techonology Budget Shares
The expressions which fix the cutoff cost draw ηTR and mass of entryM
T
R can be neatly summarized
by defining the mass of entrants who produce, M˜TR , and the (locally weighted) average cost draw
in each region, η˜TR :
M˜
T
R ≡M
T
RG
(
ηTR
)
, η˜TR ≡
∫ ηTR
0
(
ηTz u
T
R
(
UTR
)1/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1)
dG(z)/G
(
ηTR
)
.
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Using the profit maximizing price PTR j and combining Equations (2.11), (3.2) and (3.1) then yields
the equilibrium quantity produced,
QTR j = ρIAgg
(
uTRη j
(
UTR /σ
T
R
)1/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1)
/uTRη j∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ)
M˜
t
rη˜
t
r. (D.1)
Aggregating revenues using Equation (D.1) shows that each consumer’s budget share allocated to
region R and industry T is
Consumer Budget Share for R,T :
(
σTR
)1/(1−ρ)
M˜
T
R η˜
T
R /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ)
M˜
t
rη˜
t
r. (D.2)
Consequently, since free entry implies expected profits must equal expected fixed costs, the mass
of entrantsMTR solves the implicit form
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1−ρ
ρ
IAgg
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σTR
)1/(1−ρ)
M˜
T
R η˜
T
R /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ)
M˜
t
rη˜
t
r
)
=MTRu
T
R
(
feG
(
ηTR
)
+Fe
)
, (D.3)
while the equilibrium cost cutoffs ηTR solve the zero profit condition
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Equations (D.3) and (D.4) fix ηTR since combining them shows
∫ ηTR
0
(
ηTz /η
T
R
)ρ/(ρ−1)
dG(z)/G
(
ηTR
)
= 1+Fe/ feG
(
ηTR
)
.
In particular, ηTR does not vary by region or technology. Thus, Equation (D.4) shows that
UTR u
T
R/σ
T
R =
[
(1−ρ) IAgg/ρ fe∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ)
M˜
t
rη˜
t
r
]1−ρ
/
(
ηTR
)ρ
. (D.5)
where the RHS does not vary by region or technology. Combining this equation with (3.1) shows
QTR j = Q
T ′
R′ j for all (T,R) and (T
′,R′), so thatMTRu
T
R/σ
T
R =M
T ′
R′u
T ′
R′/σ
T ′
R′ . At the same time, using
33To see a solution exists, note that for fixed prices,
{
η˜TR
}
, and
{
ηTR
}
, necessarily MTR ∈ A
T
R ≡[
0,(1−ρ) IAgg/ρuTRFe
]
. Existence follows from the Brouwer fixed point theorem on the domain ×R,TATR for
H
({
M˜TR
})
≡ (1−ρ) IAgg
((
σTR
)1/(1−ρ)
M˜TR η˜
T
R /∑t,r (σ
t
r)
1/(1−ρ)
M˜trη˜
t
r
)
/ρuTR
(
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(
ηTR
)
+Fe
)
.
34To see a solution exists, note that for fixed prices,
{
MT
′
R′
}
and
{
UTR
}
, the LHS ranges from 0 to ∞ as ηTR varies,
while the RHS is bounded away from 0 and ∞ when min
{
η˜ trG
(
η tr
)}
> 0. η˜TRG
(
ηTR
)
> 0 follows from inada type
conditions on goods from each T and R.
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Equation (D.5) reduces (D.2) to
Consumer Budget Share for R,T : MTRu
T
R/∑
t,r
M
t
ru
t
t = σ
T
R /∑
t,r
σ tr = σ
T
R .
Since ∑t,r σ
t
r = 1, each region and industry receive a share σ
T
R of consumer expenditure.
D.2 Regional Variation in Input Use
Equation (4.1) specifies the relative shares of each type of worker hired. Since input markets are
competitive, firms and workers take regional labor market characteristics as given. As characteris-
tics such as wages worker availability and human capital vary, the share of each labor type hired
differs across regions. These differences can be broken up into direct and indirect effects. Direct
effects ignore substitution by holding the unit labor cost c˜RT constant, while indirect effects mea-
sure how regional differences give rise to substitution. The direct effects are easy to read off of
Equation (4.1), showing:
Direct Effects : d lnsR,T,i/d lnwR,i|c˜RT constant =−k/β
T < 0, (D.6)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnaR,i|c˜RT constant = θ
T/βT > 0, (D.7)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnm
T
i
∣∣
c˜RT constant
= kθT/βT > 0. (D.8)
These direct effects have the obvious signs: higher wages (wR,i ↑) discourage hiring a particular
type while greater availability (aR,i ↑) and higher human capital (mT,i ↑) encourage hiring that type.
The indirect effects of substitution through c˜RT are less obvious as seen by
d ln c˜kRT/d lnwR,i =
(
k/θT
)[
aR,i
(
mTi
)
kw
1−k−βT /θT
R,i
]θT /βT
c˜
k(θT /βT)
RT > 0, (D.9)
d ln c˜kRT/d lnaR,i =−
[
aR,i
(
mTi
)
kw
1−k−βT /θT
R,i
]θT /βT
c˜
k(θT /βT)
RT < 0, (D.10)
d ln c˜kRT/d lnm
T
i =−k
[
aR,i
(
mTi
)
kw
1−k−βT /θT
R,i
]θT /βT
c˜
k(θT /βT)
RT < 0. (D.11)
Thus, the indirect effects counteract the direct effects through substitution. To see the total of the
direct and indirect effects, define the Type-Region-Technology coefficients χi,R,T :
χi,R,T ≡ 1−
[
aR,i
(
mTi
)
kw
1−k−βT /θT
R,i
]θT /βT
c˜
k(θT /βT)
RT .
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Investigation shows that each χi,R,T is between zero and one. Combining Equations (D.6-D.8) and
Equations (D.9-D.11) shows that the direct effect dominates since
Total Effects : d lnsR,T,i/d lnwR,i =
[
−k/βT
]
χi,R,T < 0, (D.12)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnaR,i =
[
θT/βT
]
χi,R,T > 0, (D.13)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnm
T
i =
[
kθT/βT
]
χi,R,T > 0. (D.14)
Equations (D.12-D.14) summarize the relationship between regions and labor market charac-
teristics. For small changes in labor market characteristics, the log share of a type hired in linear
in log characteristics with a slope determined by model parameters and a regional shifter χi,R,T .
These (local) isoquants for the share of type i workers hired in region R are depicted in Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Local isoquants for Share of Workers Hired
D.3 Regional Variation in Theory: Isoquants
Equations (D.12-D.14) also characterize local isoquants of hiring the same share of a type across
regions. It is immediate that for small changes in market characteristics,
(
∆w, ∆a, ∆m
)
, the
share of a type hired is constant so long as
−
(
k/θT
)
∆w/wR,i+∆a/aR,i+ k∆m/m
T
i = 0.
For instance, firms in regions R and R′ will hire the same fraction of type i workers for small
differences in characteristics (∆w,∆a) so long as
∆w/∆a =
(
θT/k
)
wR,i/aR,i. (D.15)
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By itself, an increase in type i wages ∆w would cause firms to hire a lower share of type i workers
as indicated by the direct effect. However, Equation (D.15) shows that firms would keep the same
share of type i workers if the availability ∆a increases concurrently so that Equation (D.15) holds.
D.4 Derivation of Unit Labor Costs
Unit labor costs by definition solve
Unit Labor Costs : cTR ≡min
H
CT (H|aR,wR) subject to L= φ
(
H˜,θT
)
·HTOT = 1.
Under the parameterization Ψ(h) = 1−h−k, Equations (2.1) become
Hi = aR,ik/(k−1) ·m
T
i h
1−k
i ·N. (D.16)
From above, wR,iHi/mTi hiCT (H|aR,wR) = H
θT
i /∑ jH
θT
j , and L= 1=
(
∑ jH
θT
j
)1/θT
so
hi = wR,iH
1−θT
i /m
T
i CT (H|aR,wR) . (D.17)
Substitution now yields
Hi = aR,ik/(k−1) ·m
T
i
(
wR,iH
1−θT
i /m
T
i CT (H|aR,wR)
)1−k
·N. (D.18)
Further reduction and the definition of βT shows that
H
βT
i = H
θT+k−kθT
i = aR,ik/(k−1) ·
(
mTi
)
kw1−kR,i CT (H|aR,wR)
k−1
N. (D.19)
Again using
(
∑ jH
θT
j
)1/θT
= 1 then shows
1= ∑
i
[
aR,ik/(k−1) ·m
T
i
kw1−kR,i
(
cTR
)k−1
N
]θT /βT
. (D.20)
From the definition of the cost function we have
cTR = N
[
∑
i
aR,iwR,ih
−k
i + f c
T
R
]
= ∑
i
wR,i ((k−1)/k)Hi/m
T
i hi+N f c
T
R .
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Therefore from wR,iHi/mTi hiCT (H|aR,wR) = H
θT
i it follows
1= ∑
i
(k−1)/k ·Hθ
T
i +N f = (k−1)/k+N f ,
and therefore N = 1/ f k. Now from Equation (D.20) cTR is seen to be Equation (2.7).
D.5 Derivation of Employment Shares
Combining Equations (D.17), (D.19) and N = 1/ f k shows
hi = a
(1−θT)/βT
R,i
(
mTi
)
−θT /βTw
1/βT
R,i
(
cTR
)−1/βT
/( f (k−1))(1−θ
T)/βT . (D.21)
Let ATR,i be the number of type i workers hired to make L = 1, exclusive of fixed search costs. By
definition, ATR,i = N|L=1 aR,i (1−Ψ(hi)) = aR,ih
−k
i / f k. Using Equation (D.21),
ATR,i = k
−1 (k−1)aθ
T /βT
R,i
(
mTi
)
kθT /βTw
−k/βT
R,i
(
cTR
)k/βT
(k−1)−θ
T /βT
f−1.
Labor is also consumed by the fixed search costs which consist of N|L=1 · f = 1/k labor units.
Therefore, if A˜TR,i denotes the total number of type i workers hired to make L = 1, necessarily
A˜TR,i = A
T
R,i + A˜
T
R,i/k so A˜
T
R,i = k (k−1)
−1
ATR,i, and the total number of type i workers hired in
region R using technology T is LTR A˜
T
R,i. The total number of employees in R, T is ∑iL
T
R A˜
T
R,i =
LTR
(
cTR
)k/βT (
c˜TR
)−kθT /βT
, where c˜TR denotes the unit labor cost function at wages
{
w
k/(k−1)θT
R,i
}
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E Supplemental Summary Statistics
E.1 Educational Summary Statistics
UNICEF suggests that the typical Chinese primary school entrance age is 7 (Source: childinfo.org).
Compulsory education lasts nine years (primary and secondary school) and ends around age six-
teen. Figure A.1a illustrates the average years of schooling for the Chinese labor force, while Table
A.7 displays the frequency of each worker type and their average monthly wages by Province.
35Formally c˜TR ≡minHCT
(
H|aR,
{
w
−k/θT (1−k)
R,i
})
subject to L= 1.
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Figure A.1: Chinese Educational Attainment (2005)
(a) Labor Force Schooling (2005)
Table A.7: Educational and Wage Distribution by Province (2005)
Province Fraction of Labor Force by Education Avg Monthly Wage by Education
≤Junior HS ≤Junior HS Senior College ≤Junior HS ≤Junior HS Senior College
(Female) (Male) HS or Above (Female) (Male) HS or Above
Anhui 0.296 0.485 0.155 0.063 581 862 866 1210
Beijing 0.140 0.284 0.299 0.277 796 1059 1314 2866
Chongqing 0.272 0.408 0.227 0.093 582 820 872 1379
Fujian 0.348 0.453 0.146 0.052 695 942 1103 1855
Gansu 0.216 0.399 0.271 0.114 507 738 869 1135
Guangdong 0.327 0.362 0.231 0.080 748 967 1281 2719
Guizhou 0.292 0.478 0.162 0.069 572 758 925 1189
Hainan 0.328 0.334 0.259 0.080 532 694 894 1527
Hebei 0.230 0.515 0.190 0.066 515 793 832 1233
Heilongjiang 0.217 0.393 0.285 0.104 515 740 797 1096
Henan 0.229 0.428 0.234 0.109 487 675 714 1079
Hubei 0.271 0.384 0.264 0.081 541 757 809 1262
Hunan 0.263 0.444 0.229 0.063 634 828 889 1267
Jiangsu 0.314 0.400 0.210 0.076 758 994 1086 1773
Jiangxi 0.291 0.456 0.196 0.056 525 783 794 1240
Jilin 0.204 0.382 0.307 0.107 522 745 809 1163
Liaoning 0.250 0.410 0.219 0.120 576 822 848 1366
Shaanxi 0.203 0.406 0.277 0.114 497 731 805 1149
Shandong 0.288 0.441 0.203 0.068 602 823 863 1398
Shanghai 0.221 0.321 0.272 0.186 891 1155 1450 3085
Shanxi 0.169 0.520 0.221 0.089 502 872 857 1113
Sichuan 0.277 0.480 0.162 0.081 541 737 829 1477
Tianjin 0.258 0.321 0.285 0.136 995 1019 1074 1617
Yunnan 0.275 0.495 0.160 0.070 504 697 896 1542
Zhejiang 0.357 0.469 0.129 0.045 817 1097 1299 2333
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E.2 Provincial Summary Statistics
Table A.8: Descriptive Statistics by Province (2005)
Manufacturing Population Census
Firm Avg # of # Region- Monthly Avg Yrs
Province Count Workers Regions Industries Wage School
Anhui 2,296 208 17 822 832 8.925
Beijing 3,676 145 2 128 1665 11.542
Chongqing 1,574 287 3 184 862 9.606
Fujian 7,534 212 9 504 945 8.170
Gansu 461 274 14 658 805 9.728
Guangdong 21,575 275 21 1269 1137 9.607
Guizhou 812 246 9 464 805 8.565
Hainan 126 149 3 151 830 9.772
Hebei 5,104 231 11 623 781 9.527
Heilongjiang 921 256 13 622 774 10.197
Henan 5,849 228 17 798 720 10.053
Hubei 2,685 247 14 742 789 9.731
Hunan 3,500 195 14 751 843 9.588
Jiangsu 22,197 170 13 756 1013 9.431
Jiangxi 1,501 245 11 556 766 9.208
Jilin 927 274 9 477 796 10.340
Liaoning 5,141 170 14 770 865 10.152
Shaanxi 1,207 368 10 548 787 10.068
Shandong 12,958 216 17 947 825 9.596
Shanghai 9,857 147 2 119 1577 10.569
Shanxi 1,118 386 11 619 847 9.895
Sichuan 3,209 238 21 887 800 9.149
Tianjin 2,671 195 2 128 1119 10.243
Yunnan 733 240 16 695 794 8.675
Zhejiang 27,639 144 11 629 1098 8.201
E.3 Industrial Summary Statistics
Table A.9 presents the distribution of firms by industry and other descriptive statistics.
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Table A.9: Manufacturing Survey Descriptive Statistics (2005)
Share of
# of # of Avg # of White State Foreign
Industry firms Regions workers Female Collar Export Equity Equity
Beverage 2,225 155 219.20 0.281 0.114 0.150 0.107 0.121
Electrical 12,241 166 201.58 0.289 0.106 0.351 0.030 0.195
Food 3,807 171 193.98 0.321 0.091 0.266 0.060 0.202
General Machines 15,727 195 152.68 0.205 0.117 0.262 0.047 0.115
Iron & Steel 4,676 160 227.40 0.148 0.088 0.101 0.032 0.056
Leather & Fur 4,852 89 320.70 0.362 0.036 0.682 0.005 0.335
Precision Tools 2,702 68 214.89 0.296 0.180 0.457 0.063 0.299
Metal Products 10,686 157 146.93 0.233 0.086 0.332 0.028 0.161
Non-ferrous Metal 3,607 139 157.75 0.186 0.093 0.180 0.035 0.093
Non-metal Products 15,347 259 195.57 0.207 0.090 0.169 0.059 0.088
Paper 5,698 159 151.05 0.269 0.061 0.127 0.026 0.131
Plastic 9,235 159 140.47 0.298 0.065 0.327 0.019 0.235
Printing 3,382 98 133.01 0.303 0.084 0.118 0.150 0.109
PC & AV 6,699 90 402.04 0.342 0.120 0.571 0.038 0.459
Rubber 2,212 79 226.25 0.294 0.067 0.377 0.027 0.218
Specific Machines 7,816 167 176.76 0.197 0.154 0.244 0.072 0.166
Textile 18,292 186 222.43 0.390 0.044 0.406 0.018 0.168
Transport 8,632 168 252.01 0.228 0.120 0.240 0.088 0.138
Wood 3,629 133 137.04 0.288 0.050 0.290 0.025 0.137
F Supplemental Empirical Results
F.1 Verisimilitude of Census and Firm Wages
One of the main concerns about combining census data with manufacturing data is the representa-
tiveness of regional labor market conditions in determining actual wages within firms. It turns out
they are remarkably good predictors of a firm’s labor expenses. We construct a predictor of firm
wages based on Census data and test it as follows: First, compute the average wages per prefec-
ture. Second, make an estimate CensusWage by multiplying each firm’s distribution of workers
by the average wages of each type from the population census. Third, regress actual firm wages
on CensusWage. The results are presented in Table A.10 of Appendix F.1. Not only is the R2 of
this predictor very high for each industry, but the coefficient on CensusWage is close to one in all
cases, showing that one-for-one the census based averages are excellent at explaining the variation
in the wage bill across firms.
44
Table A.10: Census Wages as a Predictor of Reported Firm Wages
Industry Dependent Variable: ln(FirmWage)
ln(Census Wage) Std Dev Constant Std Dev Obs R2
Beverage 1.052*** (0.0147) -0.904*** (0.204) 2223 0.85
Electrical 1.018*** (0.0103) -0.370*** (0.138) 12213 0.86
Food 1.032*** (0.0104) -0.602*** (0.144) 3766 0.83
General Machines 1.020*** (0.0063) -0.365*** (0.091) 15711 0.84
Iron & Steel 1.049*** (0.0082) -0.777*** (0.116) 4663 0.87
Leather & Fur 0.982*** (0.0112) 0.116 (0.165) 4851 0.87
Precision Tools 1.018*** (0.0221) -0.332 (0.308) 2689 0.83
Metal Products 1.012*** (0.0094) -0.286** (0.130) 10654 0.83
Non-ferrous Metal 1.054*** (0.0092) -0.833*** (0.127) 3588 0.88
Non-metal Products 0.981*** (0.0085) 0.16 (0.122) 15329 0.80
Paper 1.012*** (0.0086) -0.335*** (0.120) 5695 0.82
Plastic 1.015*** (0.0129) -0.340** (0.170) 9214 0.85
Printing 1.055*** (0.0135) -0.839*** (0.189) 3377 0.83
PC & AV 1.021*** (0.0172) -0.354 (0.224) 6685 0.86
Rubber 1.000*** (0.0132) -0.133 (0.182) 2195 0.87
Specific Machines 1.036*** (0.0105) -0.580*** (0.139) 7780 0.83
Textile 0.981*** (0.0060) 0.132 (0.084) 18281 0.86
Transport 1.050*** (0.0071) -0.755*** (0.099) 8618 0.86
Wood 0.965*** (0.0136) 0.309 (0.197) 3619 0.78
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
F.2 Firm Performance Characteristics and Productivity
Table A.11: Explaining Growth with Productivity
Sales Growth Rate (2005-7)
Productivity under Unit Cost method -0.0839**
(0.0372)
Productivity under L = 4 Types -0.0619***
(0.0239)
Productivity under L = Wage Bill -0.0607**
(0.0258)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 119,159 119,159 119,159
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.027
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
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Table A.12: Explaining Survival with Productivity
Survival Rate (2005-7)
Productivity under Unit Cost method 0.0188***
(0.00230)
Productivity under L = 4 Types 0.0115***
(0.00157)
Productivity under L = Wage Bill 0.0103***
(0.00157)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 141,409 141,409 141,409
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.022
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
F.3 Production Estimates by Method
Table A.13 compares the production coefficients under three measures of labor: unit labor costs,
total wages, and employment of each worker type. In the latter case, the coefficient for type i
workers are labeled α iL.
Table A.13: Second Stage Estimates vs Homogeneous Labor Estimates
Unit Labor Cost Total Wage Bill Employment of Each Type
Industry αL αK αM αL αK αM α1L α
2
L α
3
L α
4
L αK αM
Beverage .13 .10 .70 .23 .06 .71 .07 .01 .07 .06 .07 .75
Electrical .25 .14 .47 .34 .12 .47 .06 .02 .08 .12 .12 .53
Food .14 .09 .70 .16 .06 .73 .07 .03 .09 .08 .12 .52
General Machines .17 .12 .60 .25 .09 .61 .03 .01 .09 .03 .06 .76
Iron & Steel .40 .07 .48 .25 .07 .68 .04 .03 .06 .08 .10 .66
Leather & Fur .10 .13 .59 .27 .09 .55 .01 .07 .11 .05 .06 .71
Precision Tools .20 .16 .43 .44 .08 .38 .02 .13 .07 .05 .09 .57
Metal Products .24 .14 .46 .30 .12 .48 .09 .03 .05 .23 .11 .44
Non-ferrous Metal .40 .08 .43 .17 .10 .65 .03 .04 .06 .02 .06 .71
Non-metal Products .20 .07 .61 .20 .06 .67 .04 .04 .10 .07 .11 .55
Paper .18 .14 .53 .28 .11 .52 .09 .02 .10 .08 .14 .47
Plastic .27 .14 .41 .31 .13 .43 .04 .01 .08 .06 .09 .65
Printing .09 .22 .55 .40 .14 .44 .07 .02 .10 .10 .17 .51
PC & AV .16 .21 .43 .48 .14 .35 .11 .07 .08 .24 .16 .41
Rubber .06 .13 .63 .31 .07 .55 .05 .07 .08 .11 .06 .56
Specific Machines .10 .16 .55 .31 .10 .48 .03 .01 .06 .13 .11 .53
Textile .12 .11 .61 .29 .07 .56 .03 .09 .08 .08 .06 .58
Transport .04 .15 .65 .31 .09 .53 .03 .03 .06 .10 .09 .59
Wood .22 .10 .56 .23 .08 .62 .03 .07 .07 .08 .07 .63
Average .18 .13 .55 .29 .09 .54 .05 .03 .08 .09 .10 .59
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